Collective action and rationality models

Collective action and rationality models

The Olsonian theory of collective action (Olson, 1965) assumes a model of economic rationality, based on a simple calculus between costs and benefits, that can be hardly hold at present, given the models of rationality proposed recently by several fields of research. In relation to these fields, I w...

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Autor principal: Miller Moya, Luis Miguel
Formato: Online
Lenguaje:spa
Publicado: Universidad Autónoma de Baja California 2004
Acceso en línea:https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237
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spelling oai:ojs.localhost:article-2372023-01-04T20:41:54Z Collective action and rationality models Acción colectiva y modelos de racionalidad Miller Moya, Luis Miguel Social sciences economy Economic theory Economics as a science Mathematical economics Quantitative methods econometrics Economic conditions Economic growth development and planning Ciencias sociales Economía Teoría económica La economía como ciencia La economía matemática Los métodos cuantitativos Econometría Condiciones económicas El crecimiento económico desarrollo y planificación The Olsonian theory of collective action (Olson, 1965) assumes a model of economic rationality, based on a simple calculus between costs and benefits, that can be hardly hold at present, given the models of rationality proposed recently by several fields of research. In relation to these fields, I will concentrate in two specific proposals, namely: evolutionary game theory and, over all, the theory of bounded rationality. Both alternatives are specially fruitful in order to propose models that do not need a maximizing rationality, or environments of complete and perfect information. Their approaches, based on the possibility of individual learning over the time, have contributed to the analysis of the emergence of social norms, which is something really necessary to the resolution of problems related to cooperation. Thus, this article asserts that these two new theoretical contributions make feasible a fundamental advance in the study of collective action. La teoría olsoniana de la acción colectiva (Olson, 1965) asume un modelo de racionalidad económica basado en un cálculo simple de costes y beneficios, que difícilmente puede ser sostenido en la actualidad, a la luz de los modelos de racionalidad propuestos recientemente por diversas líneas de investigación. Dentro de éstas, voy a detenerme en dos propuestas concretas, a saber: la teoría de juegos evolutiva y, sobre todo, la teoría de la racionalidad limitada. Ambas alternativas se muestran especialmente fértiles a la hora de proponer modelos que no necesitan de una racionalidad maximizadora, ni de entornos de información completa y perfecta. Sus planteamientos, basados en la posibilidad de aprendizaje de los individuos a lo largo del tiempo, contribuyen al análisis del surgimiento de normas sociales, algo tan necesario para la resolución de problemas relacionados con la cooperación. Pues bien, la apuesta que se realiza en este artículo es que estas dos novedosas aportaciones posibilitan un avance fundamental en el estudio de la acción colectiva. Universidad Autónoma de Baja California 2004-01-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Qualitative research, description, analysis variables, contrast Investigación cualitativa, descripción, análisis de variables, contraste application/pdf text/html https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237 10.21670/ref.2004.09.a05 Estudios Fronterizos Revista; Vol. 5 No. 9 (2004); 107-130 Estudios Fronterizos; Vol. 5 Núm. 9 (2004); 107-130 2395-9134 0187-6961 spa https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237/401 https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237/786 Derechos de autor 2014 Estudios Fronterizos Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
institution Estudios Fronterizos
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language spa
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author Miller Moya, Luis Miguel
spellingShingle Miller Moya, Luis Miguel
Collective action and rationality models
author_facet Miller Moya, Luis Miguel
author_sort Miller Moya, Luis Miguel
title Collective action and rationality models
title_short Collective action and rationality models
title_full Collective action and rationality models
title_fullStr Collective action and rationality models
title_full_unstemmed Collective action and rationality models
title_sort collective action and rationality models
description The Olsonian theory of collective action (Olson, 1965) assumes a model of economic rationality, based on a simple calculus between costs and benefits, that can be hardly hold at present, given the models of rationality proposed recently by several fields of research. In relation to these fields, I will concentrate in two specific proposals, namely: evolutionary game theory and, over all, the theory of bounded rationality. Both alternatives are specially fruitful in order to propose models that do not need a maximizing rationality, or environments of complete and perfect information. Their approaches, based on the possibility of individual learning over the time, have contributed to the analysis of the emergence of social norms, which is something really necessary to the resolution of problems related to cooperation. Thus, this article asserts that these two new theoretical contributions make feasible a fundamental advance in the study of collective action.
publisher Universidad Autónoma de Baja California
publishDate 2004
url https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237
_version_ 1792095226450411520

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