Reasonable Plurality and Moral Education. New Perspectives on Old Paradoxes.
This article faces an old paradox of moral education: the apparently logical impossibility of choosing the transmission of agreed-upon values and the autonomous exercise of reason. The author takes an epistemological position in which human learning is considered the result of an interaction of...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Lenguaje: | spa eng |
| Publicado: |
REDIE es una publicación del Instituto de Investigación y Desarrollo Educativo (IIDE).
2000
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| Acceso en línea: | https://redie.uabc.mx/index.php/redie/article/view/14 |
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| Sumario: | This article faces an old paradox of moral education: the apparently logical impossibility of choosing the transmission of agreed-upon values and the autonomous exercise of reason. The author takes an epistemological position in which human learning is considered the result of an interaction of individual developmental processes and the acquisition of knowledge. She assumes knowledge as a category subjected to criteria of truth, and this, as preceded by an agreement concerning values. She states that transmission of the community consensus is not only inevitable, but is essential to the development of the autonomous deliberative game and to the exercise of critical intelligence as well. However, she warns us against a possible danger: the mere transmission of accepted principles and values may place moral education under a heterogeneous direction of conduct. Educators should, by all means, avoid such a risk. She suggests seeking a reasonable plurality as a means of transmitting agreed-upon values. The notion of reasonable plurality derives from a feature assigned to John Rawls’ concept of “overlapping consensus”. |
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