Collective action and rationality models
The Olsonian theory of collective action (Olson, 1965) assumes a model of economic rationality, based on a simple calculus between costs and benefits, that can be hardly hold at present, given the models of rationality proposed recently by several fields of research. In relation to these fields, I w...
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Universidad Autónoma de Baja California
2004
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repositorioinstitucional-20.500.12930-65862023-05-09T17:04:15Z Collective action and rationality models Acción colectiva y modelos de racionalidad Miller Moya, Luis Miguel Social sciences economy Economic theory Economics as a science Mathematical economics Quantitative methods econometrics Economic conditions Economic growth development and planning Ciencias sociales Economía Teoría económica La economía como ciencia La economía matemática Los métodos cuantitativos Econometría Condiciones económicas El crecimiento económico desarrollo y planificación The Olsonian theory of collective action (Olson, 1965) assumes a model of economic rationality, based on a simple calculus between costs and benefits, that can be hardly hold at present, given the models of rationality proposed recently by several fields of research. In relation to these fields, I will concentrate in two specific proposals, namely: evolutionary game theory and, over all, the theory of bounded rationality. Both alternatives are specially fruitful in order to propose models that do not need a maximizing rationality, or environments of complete and perfect information. Their approaches, based on the possibility of individual learning over the time, have contributed to the analysis of the emergence of social norms, which is something really necessary to the resolution of problems related to cooperation. Thus, this article asserts that these two new theoretical contributions make feasible a fundamental advance in the study of collective action. La teoría olsoniana de la acción colectiva (Olson, 1965) asume un modelo de racionalidad económica basado en un cálculo simple de costes y beneficios, que difícilmente puede ser sostenido en la actualidad, a la luz de los modelos de racionalidad propuestos recientemente por diversas líneas de investigación. Dentro de éstas, voy a detenerme en dos propuestas concretas, a saber: la teoría de juegos evolutiva y, sobre todo, la teoría de la racionalidad limitada. Ambas alternativas se muestran especialmente fértiles a la hora de proponer modelos que no necesitan de una racionalidad maximizadora, ni de entornos de información completa y perfecta. Sus planteamientos, basados en la posibilidad de aprendizaje de los individuos a lo largo del tiempo, contribuyen al análisis del surgimiento de normas sociales, algo tan necesario para la resolución de problemas relacionados con la cooperación. Pues bien, la apuesta que se realiza en este artículo es que estas dos novedosas aportaciones posibilitan un avance fundamental en el estudio de la acción colectiva. 2004-01-01 2021-06-03T03:35:07Z 2021-06-03T03:35:07Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Qualitative research, description, analysis variables, contrast Investigación cualitativa, descripción, análisis de variables, contraste https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237 10.21670/ref.2004.09.a05 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12930/6586 spa https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237/401 https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237/786 Derechos de autor 2014 Estudios Fronterizos Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades application/pdf text/html Universidad Autónoma de Baja California Estudios Fronterizos Revista; Vol. 5 No. 9 (2004); 107-130 Estudios Fronterizos; Vol. 5 Núm. 9 (2004); 107-130 2395-9134 0187-6961 |
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Social sciences economy Economic theory Economics as a science Mathematical economics Quantitative methods econometrics Economic conditions Economic growth development and planning Ciencias sociales Economía Teoría económica La economía como ciencia La economía matemática Los métodos cuantitativos Econometría Condiciones económicas El crecimiento económico desarrollo y planificación |
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Social sciences economy Economic theory Economics as a science Mathematical economics Quantitative methods econometrics Economic conditions Economic growth development and planning Ciencias sociales Economía Teoría económica La economía como ciencia La economía matemática Los métodos cuantitativos Econometría Condiciones económicas El crecimiento económico desarrollo y planificación Miller Moya, Luis Miguel Collective action and rationality models |
description |
The Olsonian theory of collective action (Olson, 1965) assumes a model of economic rationality, based on a simple calculus between costs and benefits, that can be hardly hold at present, given the models of rationality proposed recently by several fields of research. In relation to these fields, I will concentrate in two specific proposals, namely: evolutionary game theory and, over all, the theory of bounded rationality. Both alternatives are specially fruitful in order to propose models that do not need a maximizing rationality, or environments of complete and perfect information. Their approaches, based on the possibility of individual learning over the time, have contributed to the analysis of the emergence of social norms, which is something really necessary to the resolution of problems related to cooperation. Thus, this article asserts that these two new theoretical contributions make feasible a fundamental advance in the study of collective action. |
format |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
author |
Miller Moya, Luis Miguel |
author_facet |
Miller Moya, Luis Miguel |
author_sort |
Miller Moya, Luis Miguel |
title |
Collective action and rationality models |
title_short |
Collective action and rationality models |
title_full |
Collective action and rationality models |
title_fullStr |
Collective action and rationality models |
title_full_unstemmed |
Collective action and rationality models |
title_sort |
collective action and rationality models |
publisher |
Universidad Autónoma de Baja California |
publishDate |
2004 |
url |
https://ref.uabc.mx/ojs/index.php/ref/article/view/237 |
_version_ |
1792609842551062528 |